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1. INTRODUCTION
According to the latest Pew Internet studies, as of May 2013, 72%
of adult Americans have at least one social networking profile, up from
67% in 2012.1 Even among older age groups, the percentages are sur-
* John G. Browning is a partner with the Dallas office of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith,
where he handles a wide variety of civil litigation in state and federal courts. He is a graduate of
Rutgers University and the University of Texas School of Law, and he serves as an adjunct
professor at SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. JOANNA BRENNER & AARON SMITH, PEw RESEARCH CENTER, 72% oF ONLuNE ADULTS
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prisingly high and growing: 60% of those aged 50 to 64 are active on
social media, while 43% of those aged 65 and older use social network-
ing sites.2 It only stands to reason, therefore, that as the percentage of
the population that has embraced the paradigm shift in communications
that social networking represents continues to grow, an increasing num-
ber of those with an online presence will be members of the judiciary.
Yet, this inescapable reality raises larger questions that lawyers, judges,
and judicial ethics authorities all over the country are confronting:
Should a judge maintain a social networking presence? How active
should he or she be? Should a judge be Facebook "friends" with a law-
yer who practices in her.court or with members of the public who may
wind up as litigants before her? And how attenuated can a Facebook
"friendship" be? If a party or witness happens to count a member of a
judge's family among his online contacts, is that itself a sufficient
ground for recusal? In short, to what extent is social media activity at
odds with applicable canons of judicial ethics?
In 2010, the Conference of Court Public Information Officers
(CCPIO) conducted a survey entitled "New Media and the Courts: The
Current Status and a Look at the Future."' Forty percent of the respond-
ing judges said that they used one or more social networking sites-
nearly 90% reported using Facebook, while 21% had a LinkedIn
account.' Not surprisingly, judges who were elected were far more
likely to use social media (66.7%) than their counterparts who were
appointed (8.8%).5 The majority of judges using social networking sites
characterized their use as purely personal in nature, and they were
clearly comfortable with this personal use-only about 35% of those
using social media felt that personal use could compromise their judicial
ethics in any way.' The judges were considerably more divided when it
came to using Facebook and other sites in their professional lives: Half
either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, "[]udges can
use social media profile sites, such as Facebook, in their professional
lives without compromising professional conduct codes of ethics."
When the study was repeated in 2013, more than 30% of the judges
responding stated that they had privacy concerns about using social
ARE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE USERS 2 (2013), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/
social-networking-sites.aspx.
2. Id. at 3-4.
3. CHRISTOPHER J. DAVEY ET AL., NEW MEDIA COMM. OF THE CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB.
INFo. OFICERS, NEW MEDIA AND THE COURTS: THE CURREWr STATUS AND A LOOK AT THE
FUTURE (2010), available at http://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2010-ccpio-report.pdf.
4. Id. at 65.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 66.
7. Id.
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media tools, while 21.7% reported having ethical concerns about social
media use.8
This article examines both the positive aspects of judges participat-
ing in social media as well as the ethical pitfalls. It will look at not only
individual instances of judges' misconduct in their use of social media,
but also the varying treatment seen in the ethics opinions and judicial
rulings from around the country that have addressed the issue. These
decisions reveal that attitudes toward judges being active on social
media vary among the states that have dealt with this issue. These deci-
sions, and the attitudes they reflect, shed light on how we view judges
and their role in society. Are judges to be viewed as isolated from soci-
ety? Are they to be viewed as philosopher-priests toiling away in our
jurisprudential temples? Should they be regarded as fully connected to
society and all of its foibles, with their work reflecting accessibility to
the citizens they serve?
Part of the problem in analyzing judges' use of social media is that
those few scholars who have looked at this area, not to mention many of
the ethics bodies that have tried to tackle it as well, tend to take one of
two paths in looking at the subject.' The first could best be described as
the restrictive approach-judges should either have no social network-
ing presence whatsoever or, at least, a severely limited one, such as a
Facebook fan page for political purposes maintained by an election cam-
paign representative.o For advocates of this approach, such a policy of
avoidance "not only safeguards the public better . . . , it also decreases
the risks of judicial disqualification and recusal.""
The second approach is what might be called the cautiously integra-
tive12 or "permissive approach."" This gives cautious consent to the
concept of judicial use of social media, albeit with considerable trepida-
tion, while imposing multiple caveats on such use.14 Advocates of this
approach have even called for social media-specific rules of judicial
ethics. 15
8. CHRISTOPHER J. DAVEY & CAROL TAYLOR, CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS,
2013 CCPIO NEW MEDIA SURVEY 13 (2013), available at http://ccpio.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/09/2013-New-Media-Survey-ReportCCPIO.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Samuel Vincent Jones, Judges, Friends, and Facebook: The Ethics of
Prohibition, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281, 286-90 (2011); Craig Estlinbaum, Social Networking
and Judicial Ethics, 2 ST. MARY'S J. OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETmIcs 2, 5-6 (2012); Aurora
Wilson, Comment, Let's Be Cautious Friends: The Ethical Implications of Social Networking for
Members of the Judiciary, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 225, 229-30 (2012).
10. See Jones, supra note 9 at 287-88, 300.
11. Id. at 302.
12. Id. at 287-88.
13. Estlinbaum, supra note 9, at 6 (citing Jones, supra note 9).
14. Id. at 23-25.
15. E.g., Jones, supra note 9, at 284 & n.26; Estlinbaum, supra note 9, at 28.
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But a more sound approach than either of these two would be the
digitally enlightened or realistic approach. Social networking is here to
stay, with over 1.11 billion Facebook users and nearly 500 million active
Twitter users attesting to this fact,16 not to mention the continued
proliferation of other social networking applications like Instagram,
Pinterest, Vine, and countless others. While the technology involved
may be newer, at their core, social networking sites are simply platforms
for communication and social interaction. Judges have had to contend
with the ethical risks, such as the appearance of impropriety posed by
other forms of social interaction for decades, if not centuries. Existing
rules of judicial conduct are more than sufficient to provide guidance
when it comes to judges' use of social media, once one recognizes that
communications and interaction via social media are no different in their
implications than more traditional forms of communication. In other
words, an ex parte communication in cyberspace is no less inappropriate
than one made over drinks at a bar association gathering, whereas being
a golfing buddy of the judge at a local country club is perhaps more
likely to risk conveying to the public the appearance of a special rela-
tionship with or an ability to influence the judge than being Facebook
"friends" with him.
Other approaches minimize or ignore the value of social media for
judges not only as a practical tool for judicial election campaigns, but
also as a means of public outreach about the role of courts and judicial
decisions. The integrity and independence of the judiciary is aided by
social media use, just as much as misuse of social networking by judges
can damage the public's perception of this integrity and independence.
In fact, social networking sites themselves provide tools for minimizing
the risks that observers often point to when discussing judicial use of
social media, such as maintaining appropriate privacy settings, having a
separate professional profile or fan page, or disabling comment
functions.
Those opposed to judges using social media, as well as those who
favor serious restrictions on it, are all too often guilty of not understand-
ing the technology itself or its benefits as a means of social engagement.
Even more fundamentally however, such critics operate under a flawed
understanding of the nature of relationships in the digital age. Accord-
ingly, this article will begin with a look at the contrast between how
some judicial ethics bodies have understood the term "friend" in the
16. E.g., Number of Active Users at Facebook over the Years, YAHOO! (May 1, 2013, 7:27
PM), http://news.yahoo.com/number-active-users-facebook-over-230449748.html; Richard Holt,
Twitter in Numbers, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 21, 2013, 11:06 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/twitter/9945505ffwitter-in-numbers.html.
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social media context and the significance, or lack thereof, attributed to
that relationship by the courts themselves.
II. A "FRIEND" BY ANY OTHER NAME? THE TRUE MEANING OF
FRIENDSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Florida, the most draconian of jurisdictions when it comes to judges
and social media, has made it grounds for automatic disqualification of a
judge if a lawyer for one of the parties is a Facebook "friend."" How-
ever, a minority of the Florida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee reached a different conclusion when this issue was examined
because of a very different understanding-and, I would argue, a better
reasoned and pragmatic one-of the true meaning of "friend" in this
digital age. The minority's view stated:
The minority concludes that social networking sites have become so
ubiquitous that the term "friend" on these pages does not convey the
same meaning that it did in the pre-[I]nternet age; that today, the term
"friend" on social networking sites merely conveys the message that
a person so identified is a contact or acquaintance; and that such an
identification does not convey that a person is a "friend" in the tradi-
tional sense, i.e., a person attached to another person by feelings of
affection or personal regard. In this sense, the minority concludes that
identification of a lawyer who may appear before a judge as a
"friend" on a social networking site does not convey the impression
that the person is in a position to influence the judge and does not
violate Canon 2B [of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct]."
This minority view of friendship in the Facebook context has been
more widely accepted in courts around the country than the Florida Judi-
cial Ethics Advisory Committee majority's view. For example, in Wil-
liams v. Scribd Inc., a case concerning copyright claims against Scribd,
the court observed, "it's no secret that the 'friend' label means less in
cyberspace than it does in the neighborhood, or in the workplace, or on
the schoolyard, or anywhere else that humans interact as real people."19
In a securities law case, Quigley Corp. v. Karkus, the plaintiff (Quigley
17. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009), available at http://www.jud6.
org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html; see also Gena
Slaughter & John G. Browning, Social Networking Dos and Don'ts for Lawyers and Judges, 73
TEx. B.J. 192, 194 (2010).
18. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20.
19. Williams v. Scribd, Inc., No. 09cvl836-LAB (WMc), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90496, at
*16 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2010) (citation omitted); see also Slaughter & Browning, supra note 17, at
194 (discussing S.C. Judicial Dep't Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-
2009 (2009), available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.
cfm?advOpinNo=17-2009 ("A judge may be a member of Facebook and be friends with law
enforcement officers . .. as long as they do not discuss anything related to the judge's position as
a magistrate.")).
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Corporation) asserted that certain shareholders were trying to take con-
trol of the company by making "materially false statements in proxy
materials."2 0 The plaintiff claimed that some of these shareholders main-
tained "extensive personal and professional connections"; therefore, the
plaintiff argued, the court should find that they were acting in collusion
to "solicit proxies and vote shares."2 1 Had the shareholders-through
their networks of Facebook "friends"-acquired a sufficient degree of
"beneficial ownership," certain statutory disclosure requirements would
have been triggered.2 2 The court dismissed this argument, however,
attributing "no significance" to these Facebook "friendships."2 The
court "note[d] that electronically connected 'friends' are not among the
litany of relationships targeted by the Exchange Act or the regulations
issued pursuant to the statute. Indeed, 'friendships' on Facebook may be
as fleeting as the flick of a delete button." 24
Similarly, in Invidia, LLC, v. DiFonzo (a state court dispute over a
non-compete agreement involving a hairstylist and the salon that for-
merly employed her), the court weighed the distinction between true
friendship, "Facebook friendship," and the instance when a "friend" is
little more than a business contact.25 Invidia claimed that it had experi-
enced an "unprecedented" wave of 90 customer cancellations after
DiFonzo left to work at a rival salon.26 The salon pointed to the fact that
their former employee was "Facebook friends" with at least eight of
their clients and argued that its customer lists were valuable trade
secrets.27 The court, however, was not persuaded that any solicitation
had taken place or that anything deep or meaningful was conveyed by
being Facebook "friends," stating the following:
[O]ne can be Facebook friends with others without soliciting those
friends to change hair salons, and Invidia has presented no evidence
of any communications, through Facebook or otherwise, in which
Ms. DiFonzo has suggested to these Facebook friends that they
should take their business to her chair at David Paul Salons. . . . If
[the 90 clients who cancelled] are accustomed to communicating with
Invidia through Facebook, they are probably Facebook-savvy enough
to locate Ms. DiFonzo's Facebook page after she left Invidia.28
In Onnen v. Sioux Falls Independent School District, a wrongful
20. No. 09-1725 2009, WL 1383280, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2009).
21. Id. at *3.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *5 n.3.
24. Id.
25. No. MICV20123798H, 2012 WL 5576406, at *1, *6 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 22, 2012).
26. Id. at *6.
27. Id. at *2, *6.
28. Id. at *6.
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WHY CAN'T WE BE FRIENDS?
termination case, the plaintiff argued that the trial judge should have
recused himself because "a major witness" for the defense posted a
happy birthday message on the judge's Facebook page in Czech during
trial, but before the witness testified.29 The South Dakota Supreme Court
concluded that the message was not an ex parte communication because
it did not "concern a pending or impending proceeding."3 0 Moreover,
the court noted that the post was inconsequential and that the judge
neither invited, responded to, nor acknowledged it, stating, "Judge
Srstka noted that the post was only one of many and that he did not
personally know [the witness]. Furthermore, Judge Srstka . .. also stated
that . . . [the message] did not affect [his] decision-making, as [he] did
not know it occurred."
Even in a case involving potentially devastating consequences of a
Facebook "friendship" between two jurors and the mother of a victim in
a criminal case, the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged the often-
fleeting nature of this relationship:
But "friendships" on Facebook and other similar social networking
websites do not necessarily carry the same weight as true friendships
or relationships in the community, which are generally the concern
during voir dire. The degree of relationship between Facebook
"friends" varies greatly, from passing acquaintanceships and distant
relatives to close friends and family. The mere status of being a
"friend" on Facebook does not reflect this nuance and fails to reveal
where in the spectrum of acquaintanceship the relationship activity
falls. 32
Perhaps the ultimate example that "friend" can often mean anything
but comes from a criminal case with important constitutional implica-
tions, United States v. Meregildo.3 1 In Meregildo, one of the criminal
defendants, Colon, moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a
warrant from his Facebook account." Colon challenged the govern-
ment's methods used to obtain evidence supporting its showing of prob-
able cause and argued that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
when he posted to "friends" on his Facebook profile about his criminal
activities.35  The prosecutors accessed Colon's "Mellymel Balla"
Facebook profile through the account of one of Colon's "friends," who
was a cooperating witness." Thanks to this "friend," the prosecution
29. 801 N.W.2d 752, 754, 757 (S.D. 2011).
30. Id. at 757-58.
31. Id. at 758.
32. Sluss v. Kentucky, 381 S.W.3d 215, 220-22 (Ky. 2012).
33. 883 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
34. Id. at 524.
35. Id. at 525.
36. Id.
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saw messages posted by Colon about previous violent acts and threats of
violence against rival gang members, as well as demands of loyalty from
fellow gang members. While the court acknowledged that the question
of "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment precludes the Government from
viewing a Facebook user's profile absent a showing of probable cause
depends . . . on the user's privacy settings,"3 and that "postings using
more secure privacy settings reflect the user's intent to preserve infor-
mation as private and may be constitutionally protected," 39 ultimately,
the decision came down to Colon placing his faith in "friends" who were
anything but friendly:
While Colon undoubtedly believed that his Facebook profile would
not be shared with law enforcement, he had no justifiable expectation
that his "friends" would keep his profile private. . . . And the wider
his circle of "friends," the more likely Colon's posts would be viewed
by someone he never expected to see them.40
In other words, with "friends" like these, who needs enemies?
The increasingly connected world wrought by Facebook and other
social networking sites has also brought with it a heightened risk of ver-
dicts being overturned by online misconduct by jurors (a topic that is
outside the scope of this article), as well as by social networking rela-
tionships undisclosed during voir dire. While some courts have found an
undisclosed Facebook "friendship" (as well as Facebook communica-
tions) between a juror and a party or witness serious enough to warrant a
new trial,' other courts have been more skeptical and recognize the
casual nature of Facebook "friendship." For example, in one recent case
involving a feud between neighbors that led to a murder, the appellant
challenged his conviction because of a juror's failure to disclose a
Facebook "friendship" with the victim's wife.4 2 The juror was not spe-
cifically asked during voir dire about social networking relationships,
but like all prospective jurors, she was asked if she knew anyone
involved in the case.4 3 She answered that she was acquainted with the
victim's family, describing the relationship as "casual" and as "not
close, but I do know them."" In rejecting the appellant's argument that
this rose to the level of hidden impartiality that prejudiced the rights of
37. Id. at 526.
38. Id. at 525.
39. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)).
40. Id. at 526 (internal citation omitted).
41. See, e.g., Sluss v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 215, 229 (Ky. 2012).
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the accused, the court opined on the casual nature of social media
connections:
It is now common knowledge that merely being friends on Facebook
does not, per se, establish a close relationship from which bias or
partiality on the part of a juror may reasonably be presumed. . . .
Friendships on Facebook and other similar social networking web-
sites do not necessarily carry the same weight as true friendships or
relationships in the community, which are generally the concern dur-
ing voir dire.
In fact, the court pointed out, with said juror having 629 "friends" on
Facebook, "[s]he could not possibly have had a disqualifying relation-
ship with each one of them."4 6
In another criminal case, a Missouri appellate court dealt with the
defendant's challenge to his conviction on multiple sex offenses involv-
ing his stepdaughter.47 During voir dire, one prospective juror, who ulti-
mately served as foreperson, acknowledged knowing the victim's
mother casually.4 8 When the defendant claimed that this same juror's
failure to disclose his Facebook "friendship" with the mother was
improper, the court held a hearing at which the juror professed "that he
did not use Facebook often and his Facebook interaction with [the vic-
tim's mother] was limited to: (1) an initial 'hey, what's up?' [message]
when they first became Facebook 'friends'; and (2) a post-trial mes-
sage written . . . to congratulate [the mother] on the trial." 49 He also
testified that he did not use Facebook during the trial and was unaware
of the postings made by the mother during the proceedings.5 0 The court
found no improper conduct by the juror, noting that while he was not
specifically asked about Facebook relationships, he had truthfully char-
acterized his limited interaction with the victim's mother, a degree of
intersection that the court found to be consistent with a "Facebook
relationship."5 1
In yet another criminal case, a defendant convicted of murdering
his then-girlfriend's son, raised the issue of juror partiality based on an
undisclosed Facebook relationship.52 The defendant maintained that dur-
ing voir dire, the juror in question had failed to disclose that he was a
45. Id. at *4.
46. Id.




51. Id. at *3.
52. People v. Campbell, No. 4-11-0517, 2013 WL 3147656, at *19 (Ill. App. Ct. June 17,
2013).
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Facebook "friend" of the victim's aunt. The court, which considered
affidavits from the individuals in question, found there was no evidence
of any such bias.54 It noted that, according to uncontradicted affidavits,
the juror and the victim's aunt "did not communicate since elementary
school, other than being Facebook friends."5
As these cases demonstrate, even when something as vital as a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial "by an impartial jury" 56 is
at stake, when examining whether an improper relationship existed
involving a juror, courts view Facebook "friendships" the way most
courts have-with a realistic, even somewhat jaundiced, eye.
Nevertheless, occasionally cases have popped up in which a
Facebook "friendship" has been held to represent at least the possibility
of a closer relationship that might meet the legal standard of bias. For
example, in Black v. Hennig, a child support and custody case, the peti-
tioner, Black, argued that the trial court erred by not admitting evidence
that showed bias on the part of an expert witness who had a purported
Facebook "friendship" with one of the opposing party's attorneys."
According to Black, the court should have admitted screenshots from the
Facebook page of Dr. Valerie Hale, "the clinical psychologist who con-
ducted the custody evaluation,"" because they pointed to a "friendship"
with Hennig's attorney and showed the two discussed such things as
shopping for clothes and otherwise "carried on a regular and personal
correspondence . . . ."I9 According to Black, this "improper conduct ...
violated the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts ... standards
and compromised her professional integrity thereby invalidating her rec-
ommendations to the court . ."60 The appellate court concluded that
"the Facebook . . . evidence should have been admitted."6 1
In Furey v. Temple University, a college student, who was involved
in an altercation with campus police and charged with violating Tem-
ple's code of conduct, challenged his disciplinary hearing, claimed lack
of due process. 62 Furey appealed the decision of a panel that recom-
mended expulsion partly because one of the student representatives on
the panel, Malcolm Kenyatta, was Facebook "friends" with the campus
53. Id.
54. Id. at *23-24.
55. Id. at *23.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
57. 286 P.3d 1256, 1260-62 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
58. Id. at 1260.
59. Id. at 1262-63 & n.8.
60. Id. at 1264.
61. Id. at 1271.
62. 730 F. Supp. 2d 380, 384 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
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police officer, Wolfe, involved in the incident.6 3 While an investigator
who looked into the matter was dismissive of the Facebook connection
(Kenyatta stated that he had over 400 "friends" and that he and the
officer "were not 'friends' in the traditional sense"),' a review board
considered it a procedural defect." However, when the Vice President
of Student Affairs decided to expel Furey, the young man went to fed-
eral court.6 6 The federal court held that Furey's claims that he had been
denied procedural due process could go forward, concluding that the
Facebook "friendship" may have procedurally interfered with the disci-
plinary hearing.6 7
III. JUDGES BEHAVING BADLY ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Besides the significance of a Facebook "friendship," judges have
demonstrated that when it comes to social media use, they are human
too, and capable of missteps, both large and small. Essentially, judges-
like lawyers and members of the public at large-need to keep in mind
that the use of emerging technologies does not relieve them of tradi-
tional ethical conventions and duties. Consider the following examples:
A. Angela Dempsey
This Florida circuit judge was formally reprimanded by the Florida
Supreme Court for two mistakes that appeared in her 2008 campaign
materials.6 8 One was a mailing that misrepresented Dempsey's years of
legal experience, while the other was a statement asking voters to "re-
elect" her on a link to a YouTube campaign video when Judge Dempsey
had in fact been appointed, not elected to the bench.69 According to the
Florida Supreme Court, this violated a judicial canon barring misrepre-
sentation about a judge's qualifications.7 0 Chief Justice Peggy Quince
said, "This case stands as a warning to all judicial candidates .... You
will be held responsible and accountable for the actions of your cam-
paign consultants including the way they choose to use new technology
like the social media."
63. Id. at 390.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 397.
66. See id. at 391.
67. Id. at 397.
68. In re Dempsey, 29 So. 3d 1030, 1033-34 (Fla. 2010).
69. Id. at 1032.
70. Id. at 1033.
71. Bill Cotterell, Florida Supreme Court Formally Reprimands Circuit Judge Angela
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B. Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board72
Although not technically judges, hearing officers serve in quasi-
judicial capacities and, consequently, can be held to many of the same
standards of conduct as judges." In Doe, the claimant appealed his clas-
sification as a sex offender.7 4 Among his arguments, Doe claimed that
the hearing officer who made this determination later posted "inappro-
priate" comments about Doe's case on a co-worker's Facebook page.
The Massachusetts court described the hearing officer's actions as "most
unfortunate" and impugning the "dignity" of the judicial process.7 1 Sur-
prisingly, however, the court did not find that the hearing officer should
have recused herself."
C. Eugenio Mathis
This New Mexico judge resigned in February 2013 amid allega-
tions of improper conduct involving his wife, who also worked at the
courthouse." According to charges brought against the jurist, Mathis
had violated the court's computer and Internet-use policy by engaging in
"excessive and improper" instant messaging with his wife.7 9 These
included "communications of a sexual nature" during working hours,
including "intimations that he had or would be having sexual relations
with her during the workday and/or on court premises."o According to
chat logs filed with the petition, one message actually read, "Don't come
knocking if the jury room is rockin.' "1 Other comments that Mathis
electronically shared included statements about the veracity of witnesses
during trials, vulgar comments about parties in a domestic-violence case,
and disparaging comments about other judges." The New Mexico Judi-
72. 959 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
73. See, e.g., FLA. CODE OF JUD'L CONDUCT ("Anyone ... who performs judicial functions,
including but not limited to . . . hearing officer[s] shall, while performing judicial functions,
conform with [these Canons] ... and such other provisions of this Code that might reasonably be
applicable depending on the nature of the judicial function performed."); TENN. SuP. CT. R. 10
("A judge ... is anyone authorized to perform judicial functions, including but not limited to ...
[a) hearing officer.").
74. Doe, 959 N.E.2d at 991.
75. Id. at 993.
76. Id. at 993 & n.4.
77. Id. at 993.
78. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Resigns After Admitting Improper IMs with Wife
During Court, but Denies Steamy Content, ABA JoURNAL (Mar. 5, 2013, 7:15 AM), http://www.
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cial Standards Commission also alleged that many df these instant
messages were sent while the judge was on the bench presiding over
trials and hearings and that he permitted his wife to read confidential
reports.83
D. Lee Johnson
This Ennis, Texas municipal judge ignited a firestorm of contro-
versy by posting on his Facebook page about Heisman Trophy winner
and Texas A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel receiving a speeding
ticket in his town in January 2013.84 The post did not identify Manziel
by name, instead referring to a "(very) recent Heisman Trophy winner
from a certain unnamed 'college' town down south of here . . . [who]
was speeding on the 287 bypass yesterday .... Time to grow up/slow
down young'un."85 Johnson later added a second, apologetic Facebook
post: "I meant to say 'allegedly' speeding, my bad."" The judge, who
went to the rival school of Baylor," inadvertently brought the subject of
legal ethics to national sports news through his actions, which also
prompted a reprimand from the Ennis city manager." It is bad enough to
pre-judge a party in any case, but sharing that partiality with the world
on Facebook? Judge Johnson also faces possible disciplinary action
from the state Judicial Conduct Commission.89
E. Ernest "Bucky" Woods o
This jurist retired from his position as Superior Court Chief Justice
in 2009 after relatives of a former defendant filed complaints against
83. NM Judge Accused of Misbehavior Agrees to Resign, ASSOCIATED PREss, Mar. 1, 2013,
available at http://www.alamogordonews.com/ci_22696063/nm-judge-accused-misbehavior-
agrees-resign.
84. E.g., Chris Huston, Over-Exuberant Judge Posts About Johnny Manziel's Ticket on






88. See Isaac Rauch, "I Meant to Say 'Allegedly' Speeding, My Bad": A Texas Judge Was
Reprimanded for Blabbing About Johnny Manziel's Speeding Ticket on Facebook, DEADsPIN (Jan.
19, 2013, 7:05 PM), http://deadspin.com/5977391/i-meant-to-say-allegedly-speeding-my-bad-a-
texas-judge-was-reprimanded-for-blabbing-about-johnny-manziels-speeding-ticket-on-facebook.
89. See, e.g., Sean Lester, Judge, Baylor Graduate, Makes Johnny Manziel Speeding Ticket
Public on Facebook, SPORTsDAYDFW (Jan. 17, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://collegesportsblog.
dallasnews.com/2013/01/judge-baylor-graduate-makes-johnny-manziel-speeding-ticket-public-on-
facebook.html/.
90. The events involving former Judge Woods and Judge B. Carlton Terry, infra note 114,
were previously discussed in an article I co-wrote 2010. See Slaughter & Browning, supra note
17, at 194; see also Katheryn Hayes Tucker, Ga. Judge Steps down Following Questions About
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him for improper involvement with the defendant's ex-girlfriend, Tara
Black.9 1 He had used Facebook to contact Ms. Black, who also appeared
before him on drug charges.92 Over the course of this relationship, he
advised her on how to proceed in court appearances before him, helped
her receive deferred prosecution, and signed an order "allowing her to be
released on her own recognizance so she wouldn't have to post a cash
bond."93 Other messages between the judge and the stylist (thirty-three
pages of which were turned over as part of the response to a newspa-
per's open records request) detailed money that he loaned to her, lunch
dates with her, and visits he made to Black's apartment.9 4 Besides help-
ing Black "behind the scenes" in her own criminal theft by deception
case, Woods also used a photo taken off her Facebook page as a basis
for issuing a probation revocation against a drug defendant; the defen-
dant's family subsequently complained about Judge Woods' involve-
ment with Ms. Black, leading to the investigation and his retirement.9 5
F. Shirley Strickland Saffold
The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court judge was linked to
anonymous Internet discussions about cases in her court, leading to her
removal from presiding over the high-profile trial of an accused serial
killer." More than 80 postings were made by "Lawmiss" on Cleve-
land.com, website of the Cleveland Plain Dealer.97 "Lawmiss" was then
traced back to Saffold's email account and her court-issued computer.9 8
The comments that were posted included calling a defense lawyer a
"buffoon" and wishing he would "shut his Amos and Andy style
mouth."99 She also commented about a sentence in a 2008 multiple
homicide case: "If a black guy had massacred five people then he
would've received the death penalty . . . . A white guy does it and he
gets pat on the hand. The jury didn't care about the victims . . . . All of
them ought to be ashamed."" In removing Saffold from presiding over
Facebook Relationship with Defendant, LAW.COM (Jan. 7, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.law.com/
jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202437652986&slreturn=20130819195241.
91. Slaughter & Browning, supra note 17, at 194.




96. Dan Bobkoff, Judge Takes Paper to Court over Online Comments, NPR (Apr. 10, 2010,
4:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=125816869.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also Kashmir Hill, Judge of the Day: Shirley Strickland Saffold, ABovE THE LAW
(Mar. 26, 2010, 1:55 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/judge-of-the-day-shirley-strickland-
saffold/#more-8157.
99. See Hill, supra note 98.
100. See James F. McCarty, Anonymous Online Comments Are Linked to the Personal E-mail
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the trial, the Ohio Supreme Court wrote, "[T]he nature of these com-
ments and their widespread dissemination might well cause a reasonable
and objective observer to harbor serious doubts about the judge's
impartiality."101
Judge Saffold was outed by the Cleveland Plain Dealer, whose pub-
lic records request included the browser history of her courtroom com-
puter. 102 Although "Lawmiss" was Saffold's screen name, her twenty-
three-year-old daughter Sydney came forward and admitted to making
"quite a few" of the "Lawmiss" posts. 03 While still denying making
posts about her cases online, Judge Saffold brought a $50 million law-
suit against the newspaper for invasion of privacy and breach of con-
tract, claiming that the Plain Dealer violated the terms of use of its
website by disclosing the identities of her and her daughter.104
G. William Adams
A kind of "dishonorable mention" goes out to Judge William
Adams, an Aransas County, Texas court-at-law judge.o'0 Although
Adams did not post the social media activity in question, the attention it
attracted led to national outrage as well as a public warning and a sus-
pension from the bench. 0 6 In November 2011, a YouTube video (made
in 2004) depicting Adams beating his then-teenage daughter with a belt
and cursing at her went viral.' 07 Adams' daughter, who wanted to bring
public attention to the abuse, posted the video; ironically, Judge Adams
actually presides over family court cases. 08 The disturbing video
prompted a police investigation, a temporary suspension by the Texas
Supreme Court, and a public warning issued to Adams by the Texas
Commission on Judicial Conduct.109
Account of Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER (Mar. 26, 2010, 8:19 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2010/03/post_258.html.
101. In re Disqualification of Saffold, 981 N.E.2d 869, 870 (Ohio 2010) (citations omitted).
102. See Hill, supra note 98.
103. See McCarty, supra note 100.
104. Bobkoff, supra note 96.
105. Jade Walker, Judge William Adams Won't Be Charged over Videotaped Beating of





109. See id.; see also Joe Sutton, Texas Judge in Video Beating Is Back at Work, CNN (Nov.
15, 2012, 1:01 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/04/justice/texas-beating-video/index.html. A
police investigator suggested that the reason that Judge Adams was not criminally charged was
because the statute of limitations had expired. See Walker, supra note 105.
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H. James Oppliger
It is somewhat surprising that, in an age in which judges and law-
yers have become sensitized to jurors engaging in online misconduct, we
actually encounter a judge who blabs online about his jury service.
Fresno County Judge James Oppliger, excited about actually being
picked to serve on a jury, emailed several of his jurist colleagues about
the unusual turn of events. 0 Among the comments was a reference to
the two lawyers squaring off in the case: "Here I am livin' the dream,
jury duty with Mugridge and Jenkins!""' While none of the emails dis-
cussed the evidence or deliberations in the case, one of the judges on the
receiving end of Oppliger's electronic communications was the presid-
ing judge in the case, Judge Arlan Harrell." 2 After the defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder, Judge Harrell disclosed the online
communications, prompting defense counsel to consider seeking a new
trial.'" 3
I. B. Carlton Terry, Jr."4
Perhaps the most infamous, oft-cited case of a "judge behaving
badly" on social media is that of North Carolina Judge B. Carlton Terry,
Jr. In April 2009, the North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission
publicly reprimanded Judge Terry for the activities of a Facebook
"friendship" between himself and an attorney appearing before him."15
Just before a child custody and support proceeding that lasted from Sep-
tember 9 to September 12, 2008, Judge Terry was in chambers with
Charles Schieck, counsel for Mr. Whitley, and Jessie Conley, attorney
for Mrs. Whitley.11 6 When the conversation turned to Facebook, Ms.
Conley said she was not familiar with it and, in any event, did not have
time for it."' However, the judge and Mr. Schiek were Facebook
"friends."' 18 The next day, during another in-chambers meeting, the
judge and attorneys discussed testimony that raised the possibility of Mr.
Whitley having had an affair, at which point Schieck commented on
110. See Corin Hoggard, Judge Oppliger Accused of Potential Juror Misconduct, Asc3O (Apr.
15, 2010), http://abclocal.go.con/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=7388930.
S11l. Id.
112. Pablo Lopez, Juror E-mails Muddy Trial, MCCLATCHY (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/16/92318/juror-e-mails-muddy-trial.html#.UjumsGTEqNw.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 90.
115. Public Reprimand: B. Carlton Terry, Inquiry No. 08-234, at 1 (N.C. Jud. Standards
Comm'n Apr. 1, 2009), available at http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/jsc/public
reprimands/jsc08-234.pdf; see also Slaughter & Browning, supra note 17, at 194.
116. Public Reprimand: B. Carlton Terry, at 2-3.
117. Id. at 2.
118. Id.
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having to "prove a negative."119 That evening, Schieck posted on
Facebook, "how do I prove a negative. [sic]"1 20 Judge Terry responded
with a comment about having "two good parents to choose from," as
well as a comment about the case continuing. 12 1 Schieck, proving that
one can "suck up" to a judge in cyberspace as well as in person, posted,
"I have a wise Judge."12 2 In addition, on September 11, 2008, Terry and
Schieck exchanged Facebook comments about whether or not the case
was in its last day of trial, with Terry responding, "[Y]ou are in your last
day of trial." 23 Judge Terry also went online to view a website that Mrs.
Whitley maintained for her photography business, looking at photos and
poetry she posted. 1 24 On September 12, 2008, in announcing his ruling,
Judge Terry even quoted from one of her poems. 125
Although Judge Terry disclosed to Ms. Conley the Facebook
exchanges between himself and Mr. Schieck the day before he ruled, he
waited until after ruling to disclose the independent Internet research he
had done. 126 Days after the trial, Ms. Conley filed a motion asking that
Judge Terry's order be vacated, that he be disqualified, and that a new
trial be granted. 2 1 On October 14, 2008, Judge Terry disqualified him-
self; his order was vacated, and a new trial was granted on October 22,
2008.128 The Judicial Standards Commission determined that he "was
influenced by information he independently gathered," as well as his ex
parte communications with Mr. Schieck.129 Furthermore, his behavior
demonstrated "a disregard of the principles embodied in the North Caro-
lina Code of Judicial Conduct" and "constitute[d] conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute.""'o
IV. OTHER USES FOR SOCIAL MEDIA
The Judge Terry episode serves as a cautionary tale for members of
the judiciary and a reminder that while judges may avail themselves-
carefully-of new media, existing canons of ethics still apply regardless







125. Id. at 2-3.




130. Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted); see also Slaughter & Browning, supra note 17, at 194.
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duct have not been raised, the ease of use and pervasiveness of social
media can make sites like Facebook tempting for judges. For example,
in one federal court case, the judge took it upon herself to investigate the
plaintiff s Facebook page to verify the plaintiff s claim of being disabled
due to asthma.'"' The court "note[d] that in the course of its own
research, it discovered one profile picture on what [wa]s believed to be
[the plaintiff s] Facebook page where she appear[ed] to be smoking ....
If accurately depicted, [the plaintiffs] credibility [would have been]
justifiably suspect."13 2
While researching litigants on Facebook is not advisable for judges,
in that case, it helped avoid Social Security fraud. But even harmless
activity on social media can invite unwelcome attention for judges. In
New York, Judge Matthew A. Sciarrino, Jr. was very active on
Facebook-posting a photo of his crowded courtroom, details of his
schedule, and even status updates from the bench.1 33 Some speculated
that his Facebook devotion was the reason for his transfer to a different
bench in Manhattan.13 4
Judges who actively use social networking platforms often have to
decide just how connected they want to be. In January 2012, a judge
from Will County, Illinois, Amy Bertani-Tomczak, was urged by prose-
cutors to view Facebook posts by a reckless homicide defendant,
Tomacz Maciaszek, before sentencing him.'3 5 The twenty-five-year-old
defendant, whose fatal 2008 car crash claimed the life of a seventeen-
year-old high school student, professed to being contrite and leading a
secluded, haunted life in the wake of the tragedy.13 6 Yet, despite the
prosecution's attempts to provide the court with printouts from Macias-
zek's Facebook profile that supposedly undermined his claims, Judge
Bertani-Tomczak refused to consider any of it: "I have not seen anything
or looked at anything," she said. 3 1
Other judges have taken the opposite approach and incorporated
social media into their judicial role:
131. Purvis v. Comm'r of Social Security, No. 09-5318 (SDW), 2011 WL741234, at *7 n.4
(D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2011).
132. Id.
133. John M. Annese, Staten Island Criminal Court Judge to Be Transferred to Manhattan
After Facebook Postings, Sources Say, STATEN IsLAND ADVANCE (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:25 AM),
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/criminal_courtjudgejto_be_tra.html.
134. Id.
135. Jon Seidel, Judge Ignores Man's Facebook Posts, Gives Him Jail Time for Reckless
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Michigan Judge A.T. Frank uses social networking sites to monitor
offenders on probation under his jurisdiction, occasionally finding
photos on Myspace or Facebook pages in which the defendants are
engaged in drug use or other prohibited behavior. Galveston juvenile
court Judge Kathryn Lanan employs a similar tactic, requiring all
juveniles under her jurisdiction to "friend" her on Facebook or
MySpace so that she can review their postings for any signs of inap-
propriate conduct that might warrant a return to her court."'
Another Galveston judge, Susan Criss, "friends" lawyers on Facebook-
a handy tool to keep them honest." "On one occasion, a lawyer had
asked for and received a continuance because of a supposed death in the
family." When Judge Criss happened to check that lawyer's Facebook
page, however, she saw photos indicating that the lawyer was "partying
that same week." 14 0
Judges do find positive uses for social media. "A recent issue of
Case in Point, the National Judicial College's magazine, suggested that
participating in social media provides judges with a low-cost means of
staying informed while simultaneously enhancing public understanding
of the judiciary."'4 1 The number of judges using social networking sites
increases every year, due in part to the increasingly important political
role played by social media.'4 2 In states where judges are elected, social
media and other forms of electronic communication can be vital in get-
ting judicial candidates' names out to voters, building awareness among
the electorate, campaign organizing, and, of course, fundraising.14 3
For those who consider social media an ethical minefield for
unwary judges, it is important to remember that concerns over judges'
use of social networking go beyond U.S. borders. In France, for
instance, a number of judges have developed robust Twitter followings
as tweeting from the courtroom has become popular. Two French magis-
trates sparked controversy in 2012, however, with their attempts at
humorous tweets during the middle of a trial for attempted murder in the
southwestern town of Mont-de-Marsan.144 One magistrate, "Ed,"
tweeted about strangling the chief judge in open court before discussing
138. Slaughter & Browning, supra note 17, at 194.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 193.
142. See id. at 194.
143. Id.
144. See French Magistrates Caught Tweeting During Trial, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28,
2012, 3:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/9708864/French-
magistrates-caught-tweeting-during-trial.html; see also French Judges Humorously Tweeted Trial,
UNrrED PRESS INT'L (Dec. 3, 2012, 9:01 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top-News/World-News/2012/
12/03/French-judges-humorously-tweeted-trial/UPI-20801354543285/.
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killing another member of the court out of "exasperation."l 4 5 Another
judge tweeted an inquiry wondering about the possibility of slapping a
witness. 146 The tweets did not go unnoticed by the local press, and soon
regional judicial authorities launched a formal inquiry into the tweeting
judges. 14 7 Both judges shut down their Twitter accounts, which led to an
outcry from their thousands of Twitter followers. One of these followers
decried the criticism of the judges, saying they had taken such precau-
tions as using pseudonyms and refraining from giving much detail of the
case.14 8
In 2012, the United Kingdom adopted new rules banning judges
from blogging or posting on social media about their jobs. 1 49 The guide-
lines include the following admonition:
Judicial officeholders should be acutely aware of the need to conduct
themselves, both in and out of court, in such a way as to maintain
public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. Blogging by
members of the judiciary is not prohibited. However, judicial office
holders who blog (or who post comments on other people's blogs)
must not identify themselves as members of the judiciary. They must
also avoid expressing opinions which, were it to become known that
they hold judicial office, could damage public confidence in their
own impartiality or in the judiciary in general.'so
Failure to adhere to these guidelines, which also cover Twitter and other
social networking sites, can lead to disciplinary action.15 1 The rules
apply to all holders of judicial office in courts and tribunals, including
banisters who serve as part-time judges (many of whom are used to
blogging, tweeting, or going on Facebook to discuss their cases-a prac-
tice that is not forbidden as it is in the United States).15 2




149. SENIOR PRESIDING JUDGE & SENIOR PRESIDENT OF TRIBUNALS, BLOGGING BY JUDICIAL




152. Another country that has seen fit to regulate the activity of judges on social media is the
island nation of Malta. "On February 8, 2010, Malta's Commission for the Administration of
Justice approved an amendment to its Code of Ethics for Members of the Judiciary. It states,
'[slince propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge, membership of "social networking [I]nternet sites" is incompatible with
judicial office. Such membership exposes the judge to the possibility of breach of the record part
of rule 12 of the Code."' JOHN G. BROWNING, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NETWORKING:
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA'S IMPACT ON THE LAW 170 (Eddie Fournier, ed., 2010).
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V. ATTENUATED TIES AS A CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
In what may frequently be a desperate, last-gasp attempt at chal-
lenging a verdict or disqualifying a presiding judge, social media con-
nections involving members of the judiciary have been cited by
disgruntled litigants. Interestingly, while Georgia's judicial ethics
authorities have not issued an opinion on judges and social networking,
one recent case did feature an allegation of supposedly improper conduct
in which social networking played a part.153 In a divorce case, a father
appealed three different trial court orders from three different judges.15 4
With regard to one of the orders, in what was evidently a contentious
case, the father argued that the trial judge, Judge Parrott, should have
recused himself sua sponte on grounds of bias toward the mother.155 In
support of this argument, the father produced a "photocopy of a com-
ment on his Facebook page, purportedly made by the mother weeks after
the hearing occurred, in which she boasted, 'Judge Parrott and my dad
had a meeting the week before our case and guess what you lost your
kids."'156 The appellate court was not persuaded that such an accusation
held any merit, stating, "[T]he mother's reference on Facebook to a
meeting is not evidence that the judge obtained information relevant to
the case from an extra-judicial source, much less that he based his ruling
on any such external information.""' It is worth noting that this same
case was rife with disparaging comments being made by both parents
via social media, such that the trial court entered an injunction-upheld
by the appellate court-barring both parties from making comments
about the other on social networking sites.' 8
A similar challenge was made during another contentious divorce
case, this time in Alabama.'59 In it, the trial court entered an order that
divided the marital assets and awarded some rehabilitative alimony to
the ex-wife, albeit considerably less than had been sought.160 The ex-
wife moved for a new trial, alleging that the judge's "social networking
connection [with] the parties' adult daughter" (who grew up in the trial
venue but now lived in England) somehow tainted the judge's ruling and
warranted her recusal.161 The trial judge denied the motion, pointing out
the following:
153. Lacy v. Lacy, 740 S.E. 2d 695 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
154. Id. at 699.
155. Id. at 701.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 702-03.
158. Id. at 699.
159. Clore v. Clore, No. 2110967, 2013 WL 3242821 (Ala. Civ. App. June 28, 2013).
160. Id. at *1--4.
161. Id. at *4-5.
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This Facebook is a social networking site where the word "friend" is
used in a way that doesn't have anything to do with the way before
this Facebook.com ever existed-the way we used the word
"friend." . . . [J]ust because a person is connected to me on here in
this manner doesn't have anything to do with a personal relationship.
I don't have a personal relationship with this friend. We all live in a
small town. I have heard both of you all's [sic] names. I've heard the
daughter's name before we came in here today.162
The appellate court agreed, observing that the ex-wife never raised
the issue at any earlier stage in the proceedings, and noting that a show-
ing of something more than "the bare status of the parties' daughter as a
'friend' of the judge" would be necessary before any recusal could be
granted.163
In Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, District Judge Thomas
Placey discovered the downside to having too many Facebook
"friends." 6 4 During a 2011 criminal case concerning defendant Barry
Horn, Jr.'s standoff with police, it was discovered that Judge Placey and
the defendant were Facebook "friends."1 65 Placey explained that while
he knew Horn's father, a former sheriffs deputy, he did not consider
Horn a real friend and pointed out that he accepted every "friend"
request he received on Facebook.16 6 Judge Placey explained that he
doesn't really use Facebook and that "[s]omeone says you want to be my
friend, I say yes. You could be a Facebook friend of mine, I wouldn't
know it."''6
Although the prosecutor did not plan to seek Judge Placey's
recusal,16 8 other observers were more troubled by it. Shira Goodman,
deputy director of Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, stated, "[m]any
judges will tell you this: There are certain things you give up when you
become a judge. Some of that is social ties. [sic] . .. You have to not put
yourself in situations where your impartiality can be challenged." 69
Sometimes it is not even the judge's own Facebook "friend" status
that attracts controversy, but the social media connections of family
members. In Will County, Illinois in 2011, defendant Kelly Klein-
charged with battering a seven-month-old boy left in her day care-
162. Id. at *7.
163. Id.
164. Sara Ganim, Cumberland County Judge Thomas A. Placey Under Fire for Having Too
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sought a new trial over the discovery that the presiding judge in her
case, Daniel Rozak, had several children who were Facebook "friends"
with members of the victim's family.170 Klein's lawyer "claim[ed] the
relationship between [Rozak's children] and [the family in question was]
deeper than a simple social-media connection," and "the Facebook
friendships between the Rozaks and the Bashars are only the tip of the
iceberg.""' Judge Rozak declined to recuse himself, pointing out that
his children were all adults who moved out of his home years ago and,
consequently, "I no longer vet their 'friends' and do not utilize their
'electronic social networking sites." 172
The only state ethics committee to address whether a judge's
Facebook "friendship" with a party or someone related to a party
requires recusal is New York."' In May 2013, New York's Committee
on Judicial Ethics, which responds to written inquiries from the approxi-
mately 3,400 full-time and part-time judges in that state, addressed the
following question: "[W]hether [a judge] must, [upon request] . . . exer-
cise recusal in a criminal matter because [he is] 'Facebook friends' with
the parents or guardians of certain minors who allegedly were affected
by the defendant's conduct."' 74 Referring to an earlier ethics opinion
about lawyers and social media,"' the Committee held "the mere status
of being a 'Facebook friend,' without more, is an insufficient basis to
require recusal." 6 As long as the parents of the purported victims were
only acquaintances, the Committee wrote, there was no appearance of
impropriety.' 7 7 The Committee did, however, "recommend[ ] that [the
judge] make a record, such as a memorandum to the [court's] file, of the
basis for [his] conclusion," should a challenge to the decision surface."
The Committee noted that "[d]espite the Facebook nomenclature,"
one has to look at the actual relationship itself.1 7 9 Here, the judge had
170. Jon Seidel, Judge's Kids' Facebook Friends at Issue in Bid for a New Trial, CmCAGO




173. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 13-39 (2013), available at http://www.
nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/13-39.htm.
174. Id.
175. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009), available at http:l/
www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/08-176.htm (determining that judicial officers may
use social networks, but "[a] judge choosing to do so should exercise an appropriate degree of
discretion in how he/she uses the social network .... ).
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indicated that the victim's parents were only acquaintances of his.180 It
mentioned, "interpersonal relationships are varied, fact-dependent, and
unique to the individuals involved."' Accordingly, the Committee
stated that it could "provide only general guidelines to assist judges who
ultimately must determine the nature of their own specific relationships
with particular individuals and their ethical obligations resulting from
those relationships."1 82
VI. JUDGED BY THE COMIPANY You KEEP: A LOOK AT EACH
JURISDICTION'S TREATMENT OF JUDGES AND SOCIAL MEDIA
Can a judge be Facebook "friends" with lawyers? What if they
practice in front of that judge? And what about other courthouse person-
nel or members of the general public? For that matter, even if a judge
does have a social networking presence, what limitations are there on
what he or she can post? The answer to such questions can be found by
borrowing a common Facebook phrase to describe relationships-it's
complicated. At least ten states,183 plus an ABA Judicial Ethics Opin-
ion,184 and a couple of recent appellate cases,'18 have attempted to
address these issues. In a nutshell, most states looking at the issue have
adopted an attitude of, "it's fine for judges to be on social media, but
proceed with caution," except for the most restrictive state, Florida,
where merely being "friends" on Facebook with an attorney of record
means automatic disqualification.186 Because of variations from state to
state, a summary and analysis is provided on a state-by-state basis. In
those states that have not yet addressed the question of judges on social
networking sites, attorneys and judges alike would be well advised to
examine the reasoning of the only opinion that is national in scope: the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.
A. ABA Formal Opinion 462
ABA Formal Opinion 462, Judges' Use of Electronic Social
Networking Media, was issued on February 21, 2013 by the ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and it reminds




183. See infra Part VI.B-L.
184. See infra Part VI.A.
185. See infra Part VII.
186. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009), available at http://www.jud6.
org/LegalCommunity/LegalPracticelopinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html.
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"electronic social media" ("ESM").m8 7 This opinion is a detailed, well-
reasoned look at the issue and likely will be looked at as a guide for
states examining this issue in the future.
First, the ABA Opinion is pro-social media and acknowledges that
"[j]udicious use" of such sites can be a valuable means of reaching out
to and remaining accessible to the public.' As the opinion points out,
"[w]hen used with proper care, judges' use of ESM does not necessarily
compromise their duties under the Model Code any more than use of
traditional and less public forums of social connection such as U.S.
Mail, telephone, email, or texting.""'8 The opinion also notes the value
of social media in political campaigns in jurisdictions where judges are
elected,' 9 0 but it warns judges (and judicial candidates) to be mindful of
how common features of social networking sites can be ethical traps for
the unwary. For example, under Model Rule 4.1(A)(3), "[s]itting judges
and judicial candidates are expressly prohibited from 'publicly endors-
ing or opposing a candidate for any public office.""91 By clicking a
"like" button to photos, shared messages, et cetera, on the political cam-
paign sites of others, a judge could be viewed as having improperly
endorsed such a candidate.192 By the same token, the opinion urges
judges who might privately express their views about candidates to
make sure that these expressions are indeed kept private "by restricting
the circle of those having access to the judge's ESM page, limiting the
ability of some connections to see others, limiting who can see the con-
tact list, or blocking a connection altogether." 93
In addition, Formal Opinion 462 reminds judges that they must
"maintain the dignity of the judicial office at all times, and avoid both
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and
personal lives," particularly with regard to who they connect with and
187. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (2013).
188. Id. at 4.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3.
191. Id. at 4 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 (A)(3) (2011)).
192. Id. at 4 & n.20 (citing Kansas Judge Causes Stir with Facebook "Like", REAL CLEAR
POLITICS, July 29, 2012, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/politics/2012/Jul/29/kansas-
judge-causesstir with-facebook like_.html). Butler County, Kansas District Judge Jan
Satterfield caused a controversy when she was among several dozen people who clicked "like" on
a Facebook post by the campaign of Sheriff Kelly Herzet. Kansas Judge Causes Stir, supra. A
complaint was filed against Judge Satterfield with the Kansas Commission of Judicial
Qualifications over the endorsement by a supporter of Herzet's opponent; the complainant wrote
to the newspaper reporting on the controversy, "[w]ith the growth of social media, the court
system needs to define how its rules for judges apply in cyberspace." Id. Judge Satterfield, in
initial comments, did not seem to understand how a "like" could be an endorsement. Id.
193. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, at 4 (2013).
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what they share via social media.194 Judges, the opinion reminds us,
"must assume that comments posted to an ESM site will not remain
within the circle of the judge's connections."' Dissemination of embar-
rassing comments or images, the opinion warns, can potentially "com-
promise or appear to compromise the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judge, as well as to undermine public confidence in
the judiciary." 96
Besides providing some sobering, common-sense reminders about
social networking interactions in general, the opinion also makes it clear
that concerns about ex parte communications, independent research, and
the impression that others may be in a position to influence the judge are
just as valid in cyberspace as they are with more traditional modes of
communication.197 It warns that
"judge[s] should not form relationships with persons or organizations
that may . . . convey[] an impression that these persons or organiza-
tions are in a position to influence the judge. A judge must also take
care to avoid comments and interactions that may be interpreted as ex
parte communications concerning pending or impending matters ...
and avoid using any ESM site to obtain information regarding a mat-
ter before the judge in violation of [ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct] Rule 2.9(C). Indeed, a judge should avoid comment about a
pending or impending matter in any court.198
The opinion also provides valuable guidance on disclosure or dis-
qualification concerns for judges using the same social media sites used
by lawyers and others who may appear before a judge. Judges can be
Facebook "friends" with lawyers or parties who appear before them, but
when it comes to disclosure, "context is significant."' 99 The opinion
points out that "[b]ecause of the open and casual nature of ESM commu-
nication, a judge will seldom have an affirmative duty to disclose an
ESM connection. If that connection includes current and frequent com-
munication, the judge must very carefully consider whether that connec-
tion must be disclosed." 20
The opinion goes on to observe that whenever anyone-whether
lawyer, witness, or party-with whom the judge shares a social
networking connection, "the judge must be mindful that such connection
may give rise to the level of social relationship or the perception of such
194. Id. at 1 (quoting ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr pmbl. 2 (2011)).
195. Id. at 1.
196. Id. at 1-2.
197. Id. at 2-3.
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 3.
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a relationship that requires disclosure or recusal."201 In this regard, the
opinion states, a "judge should conduct the same analysis that must be
made whenever matters before the court involve persons the judge
knows or has a connection with professionally or personally."2 0 2 This
includes officially disclosing any information that parties "might reason-
ably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification even if
the judge himself believes there is no basis for the disqualification."2 03
Importantly, judges need not review all Facebook "friends," LinkedIn
connections, et cetera, "if a judge does not have specific knowledge of
an ESM connection" that may potentially or actually be problematic."
In such circumstances, the number of "friends" that a judge has, whether
the judge has a practice of simply accepting all "friend" requests, and
other factors may help prove that there is no meaningful connection
between the judge and a given individual.
Formal Opinion 462 offers a practical, well-reasoned approach for
judges' activities on social media. While recognizing that judges are not
expected to lead isolated existences, and in fact experience a benefit of
remaining connected and accessible via social media, the opinion simul-
taneously urges caution in using these sites and reminds judges that
traditional ethical standards will still apply to new technologies.
B. New York
Like its ABA counterpart, New York Advisory Opinion 08-176205
is a model of common sense. In concluding that it is perfectly appropri-
ate for a judge to embrace social networking, it points out the many
reasons for a judge to do so, including "reconnecting with law school,
college, or even high school classmates; increased interaction with dis-
tant family members; staying in touch with former colleagues; or even
monitoring the usage of that same social network by minor children in
the judge's immediate family."2 06 Like the ABA opinion, it urges cau-
tion, reminding judges to "employ an appropriate level of prudence, dis-
cretion and decorum in how they make use of this technology."207 It also
reminds judges that social networks and technology in general are sub-
ject to change and that accordingly judges "should stay abreast of new
201. Id. (citations omitted).
202. Id. (citing Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualfication: The Need for a Per
Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REv. 575, 578 (2006)).
203. Id. (citing ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr R. 2.11 cmt. 5 (2011)).
204. Id.
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features of, and changes to, any social networks they use," lest new
developments of social media cause judges to run afoul of the principles
of the Rules of Judicial Conduct.2 08 Finally, New York's Advisory
Opinion also sounds the now-familiar-but no less important-refrains
to judges: Avoid impropriety and the appearance of it when using social
networking and be mindful of the appearance that might be created by
virtue of establishing a Facebook "friendship" with a lawyer or anyone
else appearing in the judge's court.2 09
C. Kentucky
Kentucky's approach echoes that of New York in its cautious
approval of judges being active on social networking sites. Its ethics
opinion holds that a judge may "participate in an [I]nternet-based social
networking site, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, or Twitter, and
be 'friends' with. .. persons who appear before the judge in court, such
as attorneys, social workers, and/or law enforcement officials." 210 How-
ever, this is a "qualified yes" from the Committee that comes with a note
of caution for "judges [to] be mindful of 'whether online connections
alone or in combination with other facts rise to the level of a 'close
social relationship' which should be disclosed and/or require recusal" 211
and how to be careful that their social media activities do not lead to
violations of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct.2 12 Sounding
alarms for the unwary, the Kentucky opinion notes, "[S]ocial network-
ing sites are fraught with perils for judges," warning them that the Com-
mittee's approval of social media use "should not be construed as an
explicit or implicit statement that judges may participate in such sites in
the same manner as members of the general public."21 3 The opinion also
warns judges of the illusory feeling of privacy that may accompany
social media use; although these sites "may have an aura of private, one-
on-one conversation, they are much more public than off-line conversa-
tions, and statements once made in that medium may never go away."214
With all of the caveats, one may wonder why the Ethics Committee
of the Kentucky Judiciary gave social media a "like" in the first place.
The Committee was swayed in favor of approving participation by
judges by "the reality that Kentucky judges are elected and should not be
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Ethics Op. JE-1 19, at 1 (2010), available at
http://courts.ky.gov/commissionscommittees/JEC/JECOpinions/JE1 19.pdf.
211. Id. at 3 (quoting N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176).
212. Id. at 5.
213. Id. at 4.
214. Id. at 5.
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isolated from the community in which they serve . ."215 Like the New
York opinion, the Kentucky Committee also discussed the reality that a
designation like "friend" on Facebook was merely a term of art used by
the site and that, in and of itself, being designated a "friend" "does not
reasonably convey to others an impression that such persons are in a
special position to influence the judge."2 1 6
D. South Carolina
Opinion Number 17-2009 from South Carolina's Advisory Com-
mittee on Standards of Judicial Conduct is brief and limited in scope.2 17
It concludes, "A judge may be a member of Facebook and be friends
with law enforcement officers and employees of the Magistrate as long
as they do not discuss anything related to the judge's position as magis-
trate."21 8 The opinion is silent as to any other issues, such as whether a
judge would be subject to disclosure or possible disqualification if he or
she were Facebook "friends" with a lawyer or party who appeared
before the court. However, the opinion did note the positive side of
judges being on Facebook or other social networking sites, observing,
"[A] judge should not become isolated from the community in which the
judge lives," and that permitting a judge to use social media "allows the
community to see how the judge communicates and gives the commu-
nity a better understanding of the judge."2 19
E. Maryland
Maryland entered the fray with its own opinion issued in June
2012.220 The Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee addressed two main
questions-the first of which was whether "the mere fact of a social
[media] connection creates a conflict" for a judge. 2 2 1 The Committee
found that it does not. 222 Analogizing an online connection to friend-
ships outside of cyberspace, the Committee observed that the mere fact
of a friendship between a judge and an attorney does not automatically
warrant disqualification from cases involving the attorney, and with
regard to online relationships, the Committee "sees no reason to view or
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2.
217. S.C. Judicial Dep't Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009




220. Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Published Op. 2012-07 (2012), available at http://www.
courts.state.md.us/ethics/pdfs/2012-07.pdf.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 5.
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treat 'Facebook friends' differently."2 2 3
The Committee also asked more broadly, "What are the restrictions
on the use of social networking by judges?" 2 24 Like its counterparts in
other states, the Maryland Committee urged caution, "admonish[ing]
members of the Judiciary to 'avoid conduct that would create in reason-
able minds a perception of impropriety.' "225 The opinion approvingly
references ethics opinions from other states, including New York and
California, ultimately concluding that a judge may participate in social
media as long as he or she does so in a manner that complies with the
existing rules of judicial conduct.2 26 Quoting the California opinion,22 7
the Maryland authorities key in on the fact that the nature of the social
interaction, rather than the medium in which it takes place, is what ulti-
mately governs the analysis. 2 28 Like other ethics committees, it advises
judges to proceed with caution.2 2 9
F. Massachusetts
Massachusetts has also weighed in on this issue. Like other states
examining this issue, it held that judges can be members of social
networking sites.23 0 However, it provided more specific guidance, rather
than just sounding a general note of caution. Referencing specific activi-
ties proscribed by the Code of Judicial Conduct, it warns judges to
refrain from the following activities on social media:
comment[ing] on or permit[ting] others to comment on cases cur-
rently pending before [the judge] . .. ; join[ing] "Facebook groups"
that would constitute membership in an organization in violation of
Section 2C [of the Code of Judicial Conduct]; . . . [making] political
endorsements . . . ; [or] identify[ing] [oneself] as a judge or per-
mit[ting] others to do so ... [so as to avoid] lend[ing] the prestige of
judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or
others.23'
Importantly, Massachusetts' stance on "friending" of attorneys is stricter
than most states. The opinion states, "[T]he Code prohibits judges from
associating in any way on social networking web sites [sic] with attor-
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1.
225. Id. (quoting MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUcr R. 1.2(b) (2010)).
226. Id. at 2-3.
227. See Cal. Judges Association Ethics Comm., Op. 66 (2010), available at http://www.
caljudges.org/files/pdf/Opinion%2066FinalShort.pdf.
228. See Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Published Op. 2012-07.
229. Id. at 3.
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neys who may appear before them. Stated another way, in terms of a
bright-line test, judges may only 'friend' attorneys as to whom they
would recuse themselves when those attorneys appeared before
them." 23 2 Here, the Massachusetts authorities cited with approval the
most draconian of the states to examine this issue, Florida, agreeing that
such relationships "create[] a class of special lawyers who have
requested this status" and that such lawyers would at least "appear to the
public to be in a special relationship with the judge."233 Significantly,
Massachusetts does not focus on the number of "friends" a judge may
have, his or her practice with regard to "friend" requests (i.e., accept
them all or be more selective), or even the nature of the relationship.2 3 4
For Massachusetts, the most important element is apparent impropriety,
and Massachusetts justifies such a limitation on judges with the fact that
it comes with the territory-judges must "accept restrictions on . . . the
judge's conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen."235
G. Tennessee
In an October 2012 advisory opinion, Tennessee joined the major-
ity of states in allowing judges to use social networking sites, albeit cau-
tiously. 3 6 Citing other states that have previously addressed this issue,
with particular emphasis on California's analysis, Tennessee warns
judges that their use of social networking "will be scrutinized [for] vari-
ous reasons by others." 2 37 The Committee declined to provide specific
details on permissible or prohibited activity by judges "[b]ecause of con-
stant changes in social media."2 38 Instead, it urges judges to "be con-
stantly aware of ethical implications as they participate in social media,"
and to decide "whether the benefit and utility of participating in social
media justify the attendant risks." 2 3 9
H. Oklahoma
Oklahoma offered its contribution to the dialogue on whether
judges may participate in social media in July 2011. Oklahoma's opin-
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06 (2010), available at http://
www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2010/2010-06.html).
234. See id.
235. Id. (quoting MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr R. 2A cmt. (2003)).
236. See Tenn. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 12-01, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.
tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/does/advisory-opinion-12-01.pdf.
237. Id. at 3-4.
238. Id. at 4.
239. Id.
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ion answers the question of whether or not a judge may have a social
networking profile with a cautious "yes." 24 0 However, in answer to the
question of whether a judge may add "court staff, law enforcement
officers, social workers, attorneys and others who may appear in his or
her court as 'friends,"' Oklahoma's Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel pro-
vides a resounding "no" (except for court staff). 2 41 Agreeing with the
observation that "social networking sites are fraught with peril for
judges,"24 2 Oklahoma's Panel opines that whether or not being a
Facebook "friend" of the judge actually puts that individual in a special
position is immaterial.2 43 What matters, as far as the Panel is concerned,
is whether or not the designation of "friend" could convey the impres-
sion of inappropriate influence over the judge to others.2 " Stating "pub-
lic trust in the impartiality and fairness of the judicial system is so
important that it is imperative to err on the side of caution," 24 5
Oklahoma held that judges should not be Facebook "friends" with
"social workers, law enforcement officers, or others who regularly
appear in court in an adversarial role." 246
I. Ohio
Ohio also cleared the way for judges to be active on social media in
an opinion by the Supreme Court of Ohio's Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline in December 20 10.247 However, doing so,
said the Board, "require[s] a judge's constant vigil." 2 48 Acknowledging
a basic reality of the Facebook era-that "[a] social network 'friend'
may or may not be a friend in the traditional sense of the word"24 9-the
Ohio Board stated that there was nothing wrong with a judge being
Facebook "friends" with lawyers, including lawyers who appear before
the judge.2 50 The Ohio opinion goes into considerable detail, discussing
not only ethics opinions from other states, but also the Judge B. Carlton
Terry disciplinary proceeding from North Carolina.2 5 1
240. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, No. 2011-3, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.
oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CitelD=464147.
241. Id. at 4, 8.
242. Id. at 7 (citing Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Ethics Op. JE-119, at 1
(2010), available at http://courts.ky.gov/conmissionscommittees/JEC/JECOpinions/JE_119.
pdf).
243. See id. at 7.
244. Id. at 8.
245. Id. at 9.
246. Id. at 8.
247. See Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Disputes, Op. 2010-07 (2010).
248. Id. at 7.
249. Id. at 2.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 4-7; see also supra Part III.I.
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Equally significant is the fact that the Ohio Board does not merely
content itself with making sweeping generalizations or urging jurists to
be careful. Instead, it goes through a detailed litany of specific rules of
judicial conduct that might be impacted by social networking, including
several that have escaped commentary by other states' judicial ethics
authorities, including the following specific admonitions:
A judge must maintain dignity in every comment, photograph,
and other information shared on the social network....
A judge must not foster social networking interactions with indi-
viduals or organizations if such communications will erode confi-
dence in the independence of judicial decision making....
A judge should not make comments on a social networking site
about any matters pending before the judge ....
A judge should not view a party's or witness' page on a social
networking site and should not use social networking sites to obtain
information regarding the matter before the judge....
A judge should disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding
when the judge's social networking relationship with a lawyer creates
bias or prejudice concerning the lawyer for a party....
A judge may not give legal advice to others on a social network-
2512
ing site.
Like several other ethics opinions, the Ohio Board's opinion also urges
judges to be cautious posting content to their social networking profiles
and to keep abreast of specific site policies and privacy controls.2 53
J. California
California's impressive contribution to the body of knowledge on
judicial ethics and social media came in the form of California Judges
Association Judicial Ethics Committee Opinion 66, issued in November
2010.254 While the California Committee gave "a very qualified yes" to
the questions of whether a judge may be a member of an "online social
networking community" and whether a judge may be Facebook
"friends" with lawyers who may appear before him, it was not quite as
receptive when it came to judges "friending" lawyers who actually
appear before the judge.25 5 On that point, the Committee answered in the
negative.2 56
252. Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Disputes, Op. 2010-07, at 7-8 (2010).
253. Id.
254. See Cal. Judges Association Ethics Comm., Op. 66 (2010), available at http://www.
caljudges.org/files/pdf/Opinion%2066FinalShort.pdf.
255. Id. at 1.
256. Id.
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The opinion begins with a helpful overview of social networking
sites and their features, including two features that might come in partic-
ularly handy for a judge proceeding with caution in the use of social
media: "unfriending" people and creating a "block list" of those pre-
cluded from accessing a user's page.257 It then examines some of the
ethical risks that can be posed by using social media, including posting
information about cases currently before the judge on "friends"'
"walls"; expressing views or not deleting posts by others that may call
into question a judge's impartiality; posting inappropriate comments or
pictures that may demean the judicial office; endorsing candidates for
non-judicial office by "liking" their candidate pages; and "lending the
prestige of the judicial office" to improperly advance the personal inter-
ests of the judge or others.2 58
Perhaps the greatest value of the California opinion, however, is its
thoughtful analysis of factors that should be considered by a judge
before participating in social media and determining if there are any
appearance issues with attorney "friends" appearing before that judge.
These factors include the following:
1.) The nature of the site: Essentially, a site that has more unique
and personal details available to the public is more likely to create at
least the perception that the attorney has inappropriate influence over the
judge.2 59 Conversely, social media pages for an organization like an
alumni group or bar association are less likely to create such an
impression.26 o
2.) The number of persons "friended" by the judge: Simply put,
"the greater number of 'friends' on the judge's page, the less likely it
is .. . that any one individual participant is in a position to influence the
judge."261
3.) How the judge determines whom to "friend": A judge who
accepts all "friend" requests would be less likely to create the impres-
sion that a certain lawyer or lawyers holds any sway with the judge.2 62
However, a more selective practice of "friending" only lawyers from the
plaintiffs bar, or excluding lawyers from a particular firm, is more
likely to lead to the appearance of bias, either for parties with whom the
judge is "friends" or against those who lack such a Facebook "friend-
ship" with the judge.26 3
257. Id. at 3.
258. Id. at 4-5.
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4.) How regularly an attorney appears before a judge: Essentially,
the more frequently an attorney actually appears before a judge, the less
likely it is that being Facebook "friends" would be permissible. 2 " On
the other hand, online relationships pose less of a risk of creating the
appearance of having a special position of influence when the attorney
rarely appears before his "friend" the judge.2 65 For example, a civil liti-
gator who happens to have a "friend" relationship with a criminal court
judge is less likely to prompt cries of "foul."
It is also worth noting that the California ethics opinion provides
several helpful hypothetical scenarios of where social media interaction
would and would not be permissible.26 6 With regard to its position that a
judge should not be Facebook "friends" with an attorney who has a case
pending before him, the California Ethics Committee is direct.26 7 And,
[i]f the online interaction were permitted, a judge would have to dis-
close not only the fact that interaction took place in the first instance,
but also that it is going to continue. This continuing contact could
create the impression that the attorney is in a special position to influ-
ence the judge simply by virtue of the ready access afforded by the
268social networking site.
K. Florida
Without a doubt, there is no state more restrictive when it comes to
judges and social media than Florida. Florida has released not just one
ethics opinion, but five between 2009 and 2013. It has also spawned a
dispute over how restrictively to interpret its ethical prohibitions on
judges and social networking that went all the way to the Florida
Supreme Court.2 69
The first and most widely criticized270 ethics opinion from the Flor-
ida Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was Opinion
No. 2009-20, issued in November 2009.271 It posited several questions:
(1) whether judges could be "friends" on a social networking site with
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 9-10.
267. Id. at 10.
268. Id. at 11.
269. See Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), rehearing denied sub
nom. State v. Domville, No. SC13-121, 2013 WL 599133 (Fla. Feb. 14, 2013). For a detailed
discussion of the case history, see Part VII.A.
270. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 17-18. The rejection of Florida's draconian
restrictions is implicit in the fact that other states have refused to adopt similar approaches. See
supra Part VI.B-J.
271. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009), available at http://www.jud6.
org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.html.
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lawyers; (2) whether a judges' campaign committee could post material
related to a judge's candidacy on a social networking site; and (3)
whether lawyers and other supporters may list themselves as "fans" on a
judge's campaign social networking site.27 2 The answers to the second
and third inquiries, perhaps bowing to the realities of political campaign-
ing in the digital age, were yes-as long as the judge or his campaign
committee do not control who is permitted to list himself as a "fan" or
supporter.273
However, it is the first inquiry, and particularly the Committee
majority's negative response to it, that has elicited the sharpest reactions.
The majority felt that allowing a judge to accept or reject contacts or
"friends" on his or her social networking profile would violate Canon
2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct, because "this selection and commu-
nication process . . . [may] convey[ ] or permit[ ] others to convey the
impression that [such 'friends'] are in a special position to influence the
judge." 274 According to the Committee, there is something special about
being classified as a judge's "friend" because that status is viewable not
only to the judge's other "friends," but to all of their "friends" as well.2 75
While the majority conceded that "friend" status doesn't automatically
mean that such individuals are in a special position of favor or influence,
it was more fixated on the appearance of such a status.2 76 Accordingly,
the Committee concluded, "[S]uch identification in a public forum of a
lawyer who may appear before the judge does convey this impression
and therefore is not permitted."2 7 7
To its credit, the opinion did discuss the position of a minority of
the Committee, which felt that the majority was attributing an impor-
tance to the status of being "friends" on Facebook that bears no resem-
blance to the term's actual meaning in an online context.27 8 The majority
opinion also draws a clear delineation between lawyers who may prac-
tice before a given judge (who are prohibited from being "friended") and
persons who are either not lawyers or are lawyers who don't appear
before the judge. As the Committee makes clear,
this opinion does not apply to the practice of listing as 'friends' per-
sons other than lawyers, or to listing as 'friends' lawyers who do not
appear before the judge, either because they do not practice in the
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judge's recusal list so that their cases are not assigned to the judge. 27 9
The second opinion, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion
No. 2010-04, issued in March 2010, posed the same inquiry about
"friending" lawyers with regard to a judge's judicial assistants or
clerks. 280 Here, the Committee recognized that keeping a judicial assis-
tant from "friending" a lawyer presented First Amendment concerns.28'
Moreover, the same fear of creating a public perception that such a law-
yer "friend" would be in a position to influence the judge was absent, in
the eyes of the Committee.2 82 As the Committee concluded,
[a]s long as a judicial assistant utilizes the social networking site
outside of the judicial assistant's administrative responsibilities and
independent of the judge, thereby making no reference to the judge or
the judge's office, this Committee believes that there is no prohibi-
tion for a judicial assistant to add lawyers who may appear before the
judge as 'friends' on a social networking site.2 83
The third opinion, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion
No. 2010-06, also issued in 2010, presented a chance to scale back the
draconian implications of the Committee's 2009 opinion by addressing a
scenario where a judge had taken certain steps to minimize, if not elimi-
nate, public perception that being a "friend" of the judge carried with it
implications of a special relationship or position of influence.28 4 In the
scenario before the Committee, the judge offered to communicate with
all "friends" who were attorneys and "post a permanent, prominent dis-
claimer on the judge's Facebook profile" explaining that the Facebook
"friend" status meant that the judge and the friend were merely acquain-
tances, not necessarily a "friend" in the "traditional sense."285
The Committee was not persuaded; even with such caveats, a judge
still would not be permitted to "friend" an attorney who might appear
before her.2 86 Even if it was the judge's custom to "friend" all the law-
yers who sent such a request, or all those whose names she recognizes or
who have "friends" in common with her, the Committee held it would
still not be permissible to have as a Facebook "friend" a lawyer who
appeared before the judge.2 87 As close as the Committee was willing to
279. Id.
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come was a pronouncement that a judge would not have to "un-friend"
lawyers who were "friends" because they shared membership in a volun-
tary bar association with the judge and "use[d] Facebook to communi-
cate among themselves about that organization and other non-legal
matters."288
The fourth opinion, Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee
Opinion No. 2012-12, issued in May 2012, represented one more chance
for Florida to step back from its outlier status by considering judges'
involvement with the considerably more professional, business-oriented,
and presumably more "acceptable" social networking site, LinkedIn.2 89
However, when the Committee considered the question of "[w]hether a
judge may add lawyers who may appear before the judge as 'connec-
tions' on the professional networking site, Linked In [sic], or permit
such lawyers to add the judge as their 'connection' on that site," the
answer again was a curt "[n]o." 29 0 While the Committee made note of
the inquiring judge's distinction between sites like Facebook and the
more professional Linkedln, it based its ruling on the unwieldiness of
requiring "each judge who had accepted a lawyer as a friend or connec-
tion to constantly scan the cases assigned to the judge, and the lawyers
appearing in each case, and 'defriend' or delist each lawyer upon a
friend or connection making an appearance in a case assigned to the
judge."2 9 1 The Committee cited with approval California's approach,
which allows a judge to "friend" lawyers based on the low likelihood of
them having to appear before that judge (based on factors like the type
of practice that lawyer has, or the court's jurisdiction), but does not
allow judges to "friend" lawyers with cases pending before that court.29 2
In the Committee's eyes, even with a site like Linkedln, it seemed more
feasible to "just say no" than to adopt an approach "that contemplates a
judge constantly approving, deleting, and reapproving lawyers as
'friends' or 'connections' as their cases are assigned to, and thereafter
concluded or removed from, a judge."2 9 3 It is also worth noting that, like
its 2009 opinion, there was a dissenting view as well.294
In the fifth and most recent opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee addressed judicial activities on yet
288. Id.
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another social networking platform, Twitter.29 5 In this opinion, the nar-
row questions confronted by the Committee were whether a judge seek-
ing re-election would be allowed to "create a Twitter account with a
privacy setting open so that anyone-including lawyers-would be able
to follow" the judge and whether the campaign manager would be per-
mitted to "create and maintain the Twitter account, instead of the judge"
directly.296 The Committee's answer to both questions was "yes," noting
the utility of Twitter for political campaigning as the Twitter account
could share "tweets" about a candidate's "judicial philosophy, campaign
slogans, and blurbs about the candidate's background," as well as update
followers about upcoming events.2 97
However, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee heark-
ened to its earlier opinions restricting judicial use of social media, noting
that certain dimensions of Twitter could violate Canon 2B's prohibition
against conveying or permitting others "to convey the impression that
[they are] in a special position to influence the judge." 298 The Commit-
tee noted that a Twitter user could block specific followers, mark certain
tweets as "favorites," create lists of followers, and subscribe to lists cre-
ated by another user. 29 9 These features, the Committee observed, posed
the potential of violating Canon 2B:
If a user posts a tweet that is complimentary or flattering to the ...
judge, the judge could re-tweet it or mark it as a "favorite." No matter
how innocuous the tweet, this could convey or permit the tweeter to
convey the impression that the tweeter is in a special position to
influence the judge. . . . [Twitter followers] could be perceived to be
in a special position to influence the judicial candidate. The . .. judge
could avoid this appearance by not creating any lists of followers.
Still, if the ... judge were to appear on another Twitter user's list of
followers, that follower could create the impression of being in a spe-
cial position to influence the judge.3"
The Committee also expressed concern that "[a] judge's Twitter
account [could] create[ ] an avenue of opportunity for ex parte commu-
nication."3 0 1 The Committee described how such a scenario would play
out:
Assume a Twitter user is a party who has a case assigned to a judge
with a Twitter account. The party could send the judge a tweet about
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the case. The judge unwittingly would receive the tweet. The only
way to avoid receiving the tweet would be if the judge knew the
party's Twitter account name, and exercised Twitter's blocking
option when the judge set up the judge's Twitter account. 302
While the Committee ultimately opined that the safest course of
action is simply to have the judge's campaign manager create and main-
tain the Twitter account,30 3 the Committee's reasoning is flawed and
reflects the same limited grasp of social networking as its earlier opin-
ions. First, the risk of ex parte contact by virtue of having a Twitter
account is no greater than that created by having a publicly known email
account, a direct-dial telephone number, or a physical address at the
courthouse-all of which are readily ascertainable about most judges. A
party determined to attempt an ex parte communication with a judge
would be only temporarily frustrated by the lack of a Twitter account or
by being blocked from a judge's Twitter account before turning to more
traditional avenues of communication. Second, the Committee mistak-
enly attributes greater significance to the act of following or being fol-
lowed on Twitter, or of retweeting and being retweeted, than those more
familiar with the social networking-microblogging site would accord
such acts. Just as it mischaracterized the significance of "friend" status
on Facebook, the Committee also places an inordinate importance on
being a follower or someone who is followed on Twitter, especially in
light of the fact that users have no say in who follows them.
L. Other States
Other states have certainly considered, but have not yet issued deci-
sions on, the issue of judges' activity on social media. For example,
Georgia's Committee, chaired by Georgia Supreme Court Justice Hugh
Thompson, began meeting in 2012 to consider a wide range of possible
updates to the state's judicial code of ethics, including judicial use of
social media."* The Utah Judicial Council has created a Social Media
Subcommittee to examine the issue of judges using social media.o5
Other jurisdictions, such as Indiana's Delaware County, have adopted
social media policies prohibiting county court employees from misuse of
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. R. Robin McDonald, Ga. Judicial Reform Addressing Social Media on the Horizon, L.
TECH. NEWS (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.1aw.com/jsplawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?
id=1202539064898.
305. See SOCIAL MEDIA SUscommITrEE, JUDICIAL OUTREACH COMM., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL MEDIA SUBcoMmrITEE OF THE OF THE JUDICIAL OUTREACH
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social networking sites.306 Such misuse includes posting photos online
of court employees "in an intoxicated condition" and discussing or
revealing on a social networking site "any information related to a judge,
co-workers, parties before the court, attorneys who appear before the
Court, local law enforcement officials, and/or any information obtained
through the employee's observation of and/or work with the Court." 0
Commentators in states like Georgia and Pennsylvania have speculated
about how a judicial ethics committee might decide with regard to
judges and social media, but official pronouncements have yet to be
issued.os One commentator has even gone so far as to "unofficially"
add Indiana and Wisconsin to the list of states weighing in on the topic
of judges and social media."* However, it is important to clarify that
these "unofficial opinions" come from individual authors writing articles
in local legal periodicals in which they theorize how state judicial ethics
authorities might come down on the issue, and they are not official pro-
nouncements from governing bodies.31 o
VII. CASES CONSTRUING JUDGES' ACTIVITIES ON SOCIAL MEDIA
To date, there have been two significant decisions discussing the
limitations that can be placed on judges' interactions via social network-
ing sites. 311 The first, from Florida, interprets that state's highly restric-
tive stance on judges being Facebook "friends" with attorneys. The
second, from Texas, addresses the issue of whether recusal is warranted
when a judge's Facebook "friends" happen to include someone affiliated
with the victim(s) of a crime.
306. DEL. CIR. CT. Soc. NETWORKING POLICY (2011), available at http://www.thestarpress.
com/assets/pdf/C7178737830.pdf.
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., J. Randolph Evans & Joshua B. Belinfante, Ga. Judges on Facebook: To Friend
or Not to Friend?, L. TECH. NEws (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.1aw.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/
PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202512740798; Samuel C. Stretton, Do Judicial Officers Belong on
Facebook?, L. TECH. NEws (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/
PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202533670255; see also McDonald, supra note 304.
309. See Brian Hull, Note, Why Can't We Be "Friends"? A Call for a Less Stringent Policy for
Judges Using Online Social Networking, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 595, 608 & n.93, 612, 614 (2012).
310. See, e.g., Adrienne Meiring, Ethical Considerations of Using Social Networking Sites,
IND. CT. TIMES, Dec. 2009, at 10, available at http://indianacourts.us/times/2009/12/ethical-
considerations-of-using-social-networking-sites/; Richard J. Sankovitz, Can't We Be Friends?
Judges and Social Networking, THE TImRD BRANCH, Winter 2010, at 10.
311. Although a case has not yet surfaced, New York has also addressed this issue in a
hypothetical in an ethics opinion. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 13-39 (2013),
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/13-39.htm.
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A. Domville v. State
In Domville v. State,3 12 Pierre Domville faced three charges of lewd
and lascivious battery on a child.3 1 At the trial court level, Domville's
attorney filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge because he happened
to be "friends" on Facebook with the prosecutor handling the case.3 14
Domville's affidavit in support of the disqualification motion pointed
out that he himself was a Facebook user and that his "friends" on that
site were limited to his "closest friends and associates, persons whom
[he] could not perceive with anything but favor, loyalty, and partial-
ity."" His affidavit also "attributed [previous] adverse rulings to the
judge's Facebook relationship with the prosecutor. The trial judge
denied the motion as 'legally insufficient.' "316
On appeal, in a September 5, 2012 per curiam opinion, the Court of
Appeals relied heavily on the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee's
November 2009 ethics opinion prohibiting judges from being Facebook
"friends" with attorneys.3 17 Reiterating the Committee's conclusion that
"a judge's activity on a social networking site may undermine confi-
dence in the judge's neutrality," and because it felt that Domville had
"alleged facts that would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-
founded fear of not receiving a fair trial," the appellate court denied
disqualification and remanded to the circuit court.3'6 Interestingly, the
three elements that the Court of Appeals took from the 2009 ethics opin-
ion in bringing judges' social networking activities within the prohibi-
tion of Canon 2B were the following: (1) "[t]he judge must establish the
social networking page"; (2) the site must give the judge discretion to
accept or reject "friend" requests; and (3) "[t]he identity of the
'friends' . . . selected by the judge . . . must then be communicated to
others."3 19 The first two elements-having a Facebook profile and being
able to accept or decline "friend" requests-have nothing to do with
Canon 2B's prohibition against conveying or allowing others to convey
312. 103 So. 3d 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), rehearing denied No. 4112-556, 2013 WL
163429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2013), affd sub nom. State v. Domville, No. SCl3-121, 2013
WL 599133 (Fla. Feb. 14, 2013).
313. E.g., Lisa J. Huriash, State Pondering Whether to Hear Case of Who Judges Can
"Friend", SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 4, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-02-04/news/fl-
florida-facebook-judge-20130204_1.crirninal-case-appeal-judge-friend.
314. Donville, 103 So. 3d at 185.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 185-86 (citing Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009), available
at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-20.
html).
318. Id. at 186.
319. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
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the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. 3 20 The third element, that the "friend" status must be communi-
cated to others, is the only one of any bearing to the Committee's (and
now the appellate court's) chief concern. Why, then, does Florida's Judi-
cial Ethics Advisory Committee not simply elect a lesser prohibition? In
other words, instead of banning judges from "friending" attorneys alto-
gether, why not simply require judges to keep their "friends" private by
implementing the appropriate privacy settings on their profiles?
It is a question that has not been answered by Florida authorities, or
indeed any of the few states that restrict judges from "friending" attor-
neys who appear before them, such as California or Oklahoma. How-
ever, there are both practical concerns and policy reasons why this may
not be a workable solution. From a practical standpoint, such a tactic
would require judges to master their privacy settings and to be vigilant
for changes made by Facebook and other social networking sites to their
privacy policies, which have been revised repeatedly and are likely to be
revised often in the future. It would also demand imposing a similar
requirement on attorneys to keep all of their "friends" private, if this list
of "friends" happened to include members of the judiciary. Not only
would this involve a sweeping change affecting a population outside the
jurisdiction of judicial ethics authorities, it would also present-on a
grander scale-the same kind of practical challenge of requiring attor-
neys to implement and keep up with the ever-changing privacy function-
ality of Facebook and other sites.
From a public policy perspective, the idea of allowing judges to
have a list of attorney "friends," as long as they keep it hidden from
public view, is hardly likely to fulfill the goal of maintaining the pub-
lic's confidence in the integrity of the legal system and the impartiality
of the judiciary. If anything, such a policy is only likely to erode public
confidence and generate distrust of both the process and the outcome of
a particular proceeding. It is a fact of life that relationships exist between
judges and lawyers that are not public knowledge, such as golfing, hunt-
ing, or other social relationships, but it is another thing entirely to have a
policy or mandate to keep these relationships hidden.
In any event, in January 2013, the Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeals ruled on the State's Motion for Rehearing and Motion for Certi-
fication.321 While the court denied the motion for rehearing, it did certify
the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Where the presid-
ing judge in a criminal case has accepted the prosecutor assigned to the
320. See FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (2008).
321. Domville v. State, No. 4D12-556, 2013 WL 163429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2013),
af'd sub nom. State v. Domville, No. SCl3-121, 2013 WL 599133 (Fla. Feb. 14, 2013).
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case as a Facebook 'friend,' would a reasonably prudent person fear that
he could not get a fair and impartial trial, so that the defendant's motion
for disqualification should be granted?"3 2 2 While Judge Gross concurred
in the certification of the question, his concurrence left no doubt as to his
opinion regarding judges being active on social media:
Judges do not have the unfettered social freedom of teenagers. Cen-
tral to the public's confidence in the courts is the belief that fair deci-
sions are rendered by an impartial tribunal. Maintenance of the
appearance of impartiality requires the avoidance of entanglements
and relationships that compromise that appearance. Unlike face to
face [sic] social interaction, an electronic blip on a social media site
can become eternal in the electronic ether of the [I]ntemet. Posts on a
Facebook page might be of a type that a judge should not consider in
a given case. The existence of a judge's Facebook page might exert
pressure on lawyers or litigants to take direct or indirect action to
curry favor with the judge. As we recognized in the panel opinion, a
person who accepts the responsibility of being a judge must also
accept limitations on personal freedom.32 3
Although both this appellate court and the Attorney General of the
State of Florida considered this issue to be of "great public impor-
tance,"324 in February 2013, the Florida Supreme Court declined to hear
the appeal and consider the question that had been certified to it, giving
no reason for its decision.32 5 Consequently, the 2009 Judicial Ethics
Advisory Committee ethics ruling remains the prevailing law in Florida,
if nowhere else.
B. Youkers v. State
Youkers v. State,3 26 a criminal appellate case, dealt with a situation
strikingly similar to the one before the New York Committee on Judicial
Ethics, 327 with the only difference being a twist involving an actual com-
munication on Facebook between the victim's father and the trial
judge. 328 Youkers appealed the revocation of his eight-year prison sen-
tence and community supervision following his conviction for assaulting
his pregnant girlfriend. 329 Among his grounds for appeal was the conten-
tion that he did not receive a fair trial because trial judge lacked impar-
322. Domville, 2013 WL 163429, at *1.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. State v. Domville, No. SC13-121, 2013 WL 599133 (Fla. Feb. 14, 2013).
326. 400 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2013).
327. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 13-39 (2013), available at http://www.
nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/1 3-39.htm.
328. Youkers, 400 S.W.3d at 204.
329. Id. at 203.
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tiality because of a Facebook "friendship" with the girlfriend's father
and an alleged ex parte communication.3 3 0 At his motion for new trial,
the trial judge testified that he knew the father from having run for
elected office at the same time, and that while they were Facebook
"friends," that was "the extent of their relationship."331 Their only com-
munication through Facebook began just before to the defendant's origi-
nal plea when the father messaged the judge to seek leniency for
Youkers.3 32
The trial judge's actions were a model of how to respond to any ex
parte communication, whether received through Facebook or more tradi-
tional media:
The judge responded online formally[,] advising the father [that] the
communication was in violation of rules precluding ex parte commu-
nications ... [and] that any further communications from the father
about the case or any other pending legal matter would result in the
father being removed as one of the judge's Facebook 'friends.' The
judge's online response also advised that the judge was placing a
copy of the communications in the court's file, disclosing the incident
to the lawyers, and contacting the judicial conduct commission to
determine if further steps were required.33
The father responded and apologized "for breaking any 'rules or laws'
and promising not to . . . make comments 'relating to criminal cases' in
the future."334 Per the testimony offered at the hearing on the motion for
new trial, the trial judge followed through with all of the steps that he
indicated would be taking.3 35
In a thoughtful, thorough, and well-reasoned opinion, Justice Mary
Murphy of Dallas' Fifth District Court of Appeals first pointed out that
this was a case of first impression in Texas: "No Texas court appear[ed]
to have addressed the propriety of a judge's use of social media websites
such as Facebook. Nor [wa]s there a rule, canon of ethics, or judicial
ethics opinion in Texas proscribing such use.""' Justice Murphy went
on to cite ABA Judicial Ethics Opinion 462 approvingly, both for the
beneficial aspects of allowing judges to use Facebook (i.e., remaining
active in the community) and for the proposition that the status of
Facebook "friends" is not necessarily representative of "the degree or
330. Id.
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intensity of a judge's relationship with that person."" As the court
pointed out, "the designation, standing alone, provides no insight into
the nature of the relationship." 3 3 And in examining the record for fur-
ther context, the court noted that there was nothing to indicate that the
"Facebook friendship" between the judge and the girlfriend's father-
who was actually asking for leniency-was anything but a fleeting
acquaintance.3 39
Most importantly, the court pointed out, the judge fully complied
with the state protocol for dealing with ex parte communications. 3 4 0 And
while the court noted that judges should, in using social media, remain
mindful of their responsibilities under applicable judicial codes of con-
duct, everything about this judge's actions was consistent with promot-
ing public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.34 1
Significantly, the court observed that while new technology may have
ushered in new ways to communicate and share information, the same
ethical rules apply: "[W]hile the [I]nternet and social media websites
create new venues for communications, our analysis should not change
because an ex parte communication occurs online or offline."3 4 2
VIII. CONCLUSION
Most states, and ABA Judicial Ethics Opinion 462, acknowledge
that the use of social networking sites can benefit judges in both their
personal and professional lives, including not just helping a judge stay in
touch with the rest of the community, but also providing vital tools for
raising both funds and voter awareness in states where judges are elected
officials. In addition, most states view the mere existence of a Facebook
"friendship," without more, as signifying very little due to the realities
of "friendship" in the digital age. However, as the examples discussed in
this article illustrate, treatment of judges' use of social media contains
some variances from state to state. As existing rules of judicial ethics
continue to be applied to scenarios involving technology never envi-
sioned when those rules were created, some tension will no doubt con-
tinue to exist where technology and the law intersect.
Albert Einstein once said, "It has become appallingly obvious that
our technology has exceeded our humanity."34 3 This is particularly true
337. Id. at 205-06 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462,
at 3 (2013)).
338. Id. at 206 (citation omitted).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 207.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 206.
343. This quotation is commonly, if not reliably, attributed to Albert Einstein.
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in an age where "friending" has become a verb, relationships are formed
with the speed of a search engine, increasing numbers of people live
more and more of their lives online, and digital intimacy has become the
norm. And in a society that has become accustomed to politicians, enter-
tainers, star athletes, and other celebrities being hoisted on their own
digital petards and undone by social media miscues, it is only prudent to
regard social media as something of an ethical minefield for judges.
Even pop culture reminds us of this fact. The CBS legal drama The
Good Wife aired an episode entitled What Went Wrong, in which the
intrepid lawyers at Lockhart Gardner attempted to set aside a verdict in
which an innocent defendant is convicted of murder.3  As they search
for signs of juror misconduct, they learn that the judge-lauded as an
expert on legal ethics-had inadvertently connected with one of the
jurors via social media during the trial. 34 5
Perhaps appropriately in an era of Facebook's hold over society,
the issue of judges and social media can best be described with one of
the social networking site's contributions to our twenty-first century lex-
icon: "It's complicated." While a judge's misuse of social media can
certainly violate canons of ethics and negatively impact public percep-
tion of the judiciary, so can other, more traditional relationships formed
or communications made by judges. As social networking continues its
inexorable spread, and as young lawyers join the judicial ranks while
older jurists cautiously embrace digital media, the issue of judges' activ-
ities on social media will become increasingly prominent. An approach
that is either overly restrictive or too cautious in its interpretation of
modern communication platforms with existing principles of judicial
ethics does no one a service-not the judiciary, not the legal profession,
and certainly not the public itself. A more digitally enlightened and real-
istic approach, on the other hand, acknowledges the folly of either trying
to come up with new rules every time technology threatens the status
quo, or of ignoring or proscribing the use of such innovations. Isolating
judges from something viewed as so vital by much of the community is
hardly desirable, as is depriving judges of technological knowledge (or
at least familiarity) that can inform their handling of cases.
While judges should proceed with caution when using social
networking platforms-as they should with any communication plat-
form-they should still proceed.
344. The Good Wife: What Went Wrong (CBS television broadcast Dec. 11, 2011).
345. Id.
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